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Some of the most influential studies of Democritus’ ethics have accused the 
Abderite of “naïveté” in mishandling the so-called “great problem” of the compati-
bility of free will and determinism. The same studies seem to ignore his treatment 
of the problem of what is ‘up to us’ (eph’ hêmin), a problem that relates to virtually 
all the most important maxims and fragments attributed to Democritus that have 
survived.1 Other studies that have concentrated not on what Democritus failed to 
say about free will and determinism, but on what he did say about agency and 
responsibility, character formation and reformation, autonomy and compulsion, 
seem to me to have produced more charitable, more interesting and more satisfac-
tory interpretations of Democritus’ philosophy as a whole, especially with respect 
to the issue of the relationship between his physics and ethics.2  
Determinism is a doubtful concept in application to Democritus’ natural philo-
sophy, especially if one has in mind a quasi-Laplacean picture,3 as do most of those 
contemporary philosophers who address the ethical implications of determinism.4 
Further, it has been shown that the metaphysical problem of free will in relation to 
-------------------------------------------- 
1 Bailey: “by the time of Democritus this great question was apparently not even simmering and he 
proceeds to lay down his directions for the moral life with a simple naïveté, unconscious of the problem 
which he himself had raised by insistence on the supremacy of ‘necessity’ in the physical world. His 
moral precepts are given on the assumption that man is free to act as he will” (1928: 188). After quoting 
this, Barnes comments: “But by Democritus’ time the ‘great question’ was simmering. […] I incline to 
the somber conclusion that physics and ethics were so successfully compartmentalized in Democritus’ 
capacious mind that he never attended to the large issues which their cohabitation produces” (1979: 
535). See also: Greene 1936: 125-126; Luria 1964: 7; Huby 1967: 353-362; Edmonds 1972: 357; and 
Brumbaugh 1981: 83-85. 
2 I have found the following studies most useful for the issues discussed in this paper: Natorp 1893, 
Langerbeck 1935, Stella 1942, Vlastos 1945 and 1946, Havelock 1957, Guazzoni 1969, Zeppi 1971, 
Ferwerda 1972, Kahn 1985 and 1998, Konstan 1987, Farrar 1988, Salem 1996, Morel 1996 and 2003, 
Warren 2002, and Annas 2002. 
3 See, e.g., Sfendoni-Mentzou 1983: 220-231. Balme 1941 argues correctly that the early atomists’ 
failure to understand inertia rules out for them any commitment to determinism of a Laplacean sort. 
Morel 2003: 21-35, rightly distinguishes between Democritus’ commitment to the thesis that every 
effect has a cause, and the Laplacean thesis that all causes past, present, and future are fixed and can in 
theory be predicted or computed. 
4 Dennett and Taylor 2001 suggest that “the average educated person’s causal working assumptions 
about the cosmos still resemble the Democritean account, and philosophers traditionally rely on nothing 
more sophisticated when exploring the implications of determinism and indeterminism, causation and 
probability” (274). But many working philosophers seem to have in mind a Laplacean conception that 
defines determinism in terms of a given state of the universe (usually in the remote past) combined with 
the laws of nature (e.g. Quine 1969; Dennett 2003: 29; Van Inwagen 2003: 39, 45).  
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determinism has its origin in much later ancient philosophical concerns.5 It is pos-
sible that as early as Epicurus Democritus’ emphasis on necessity was criticized for 
threatening human agency and implying fatalism.6 Nevertheless, there is a risk of 
anachronism in interpreting and evaluating Democritus as a philosopher by means 
of the highly problematic categories of free will and determinism.7  
In the present essay I focus instead on developing a positive interpretation of 
Democritus’ theory of agency and responsibility, building on previous studies that 
have already gone far in demonstrating his innovativeness and importance to the 
history and philosophy of these concepts. I do not claim originality for my interpre-
tation of the individual fragments. The interpretation will be defended by a synthe-
sis of several familiar ethical fragments and maxims presented in the framework of 
an ancient problem that, unlike the problem of free will and determinism, Democri-
tus almost certainly did confront: the problem of the causes of human goodness 
and success. I summarize his view as follows. Luck and the gods are causal factors 
not up to us, but they are not decisive causes of doing well or poorly. (Democritus 
may go so far as to eliminate luck as a cause of good or bad things altogether.) 
Nature is not fixed but docile. An individual human’s nature is not re-ducible to its 
genetic or congenital or racial nature, but is largely a function of his or her mind 
and way of thinking, and can thus be reformed by learning and argument. (In fact, 
Democritus envisions using the plasticity of human nature to reform his auditors by 
“changing our minds”, in a quite literal sense.) Training, thought, and education  
play the most important role in most human success. In particular, Democritus 
emphasizes teaching (didachê, B33, B172), thought or judgment (gnômê, B35, 
B119, B175, B191, B223), intellect or understanding (nous, B35, B175; dianoia, 
B191), intelligence (phronesis, B119), wisdom (sophia, B197); right thinking 
(euthugnômos, B181, B191), and reasoning (logismos, B181, B187, B290) as the 
keys to human goodness and success.8 Democritus also lays great stress on deliber-
ation: “For humans, bad grows out of good, if one does not know how to guide and 
drive it smoothly. It is not right to judge such things in terms of their bad effects, 
but in connection with their good ones. And if someone deliberates (boulomenôi), 
good instruments can be used as a safeguard against bad things” (68B173).9 Ignor-
-------------------------------------------- 
5 Bobzien 1998: 133-175; cf. 2000: 287-337. 
6 Bailey 1928: 318; Sedley 1983. The key primary evidence is Diogenes of Oinoanda 33.2 and Ep. 
Menoec. 134. I agree with Furley, who remains “not quite convinced. […] I doubt if Democritus was 
really a ‘fatalist’ in any recognizable sense: his ethical views do not seem to me consistent with a belief 
in fatalism. Epicurus may, however, have thought that fatalism followed from Democritus’ physical 
theories. But it is possible he had others in mind” (1967: 175). 
7 In response to those critics who have suggested that these concepts are trans-historical and present a 
unique problem for Democritus, I have (2009) defended what I take to be a plausible account of the 
compatibility of agent responsibility with Democritean causal necessitation. I went so far as to argue 
that, given the threat of causal indeterminacy to personal responsibility, something like a Democritean 
view of “spontaneity” might be more of an ally than an enemy to a robust account of human responsi-
bility and freedom. 
8 See also Kahn 1998: 35, quoted below. Fragments of Democritus are cited by reference to Di-
els/Kranz section 68. 
9 Stobaeus 2.9.2. “It is better to deliberate (probouleuesthai) before action than to regret it after-
wards” (Democrates 31 = 68B66); “One’s enemy is not the man who does wrong, but the one who 
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ance and its associated vices are represented as failures to properly deliberate or 
reason, and are blamed on those he calls “fools” or “senseless” (anoêmones, liter-
ally “those acting without nous”), who are treated as the causes of their own mis-
ery, failures, and doing of bad things (e.g. B197, cf. B119). Given this network of 
evidence, Democritus’ account of the virtues and success is naturally interpreted as 
an intellectualist one, as I will argue. His focus on our intellectual powers as the 
source of our own agency and cause of our success led him to remarkable break-
throughs in moral psychology, including the development of a kind of cognitive-
behavioral therapy for stress and anxiety, and the proposal of an autonomous 
source of moral sanction. 
An	  aporia	  about	  the	  possible	  causes	  of	  goodness	  and	  success	  
Since we lack any context for the fragments and maxims of Democritus’ eth-
ics, it is necessary to look elsewhere for a framework in which they can be inter-
preted as a whole. Aristotle supplies the least anachronistic and most directly com-
parable framework for interpreting Democritus’ ethics. Early on in both versions of 
the Ethics, he raises the “aporia of whether eudaimonia comes about by learning 
(mathêton), habituation (ethiston), or some other kind of training (allôs pôs 
askêton) or whether it comes in accordance with some divinity (kata tina theian) or 
through luck (dia tuchên)” (EN I 10, 1099b9-11). In the Eudemian Ethics, he treats 
it first among “the controversies about the nature and causes of eu-daimonia” 
(1214b24). 
First we must investigate in what the good life consists and how it is acquired, and 
whether it is by nature (phusei) that all those men to whom the term is applied come to 
be happy (as we become tall people and short people and different colored people), or 
due to learning (dia mathêseôs) so that happiness will be a kind of knowledge, or due to 
some kind of training (dia tinos askêseôs). For many things happen neither in accord-
ance with nature nor learning (oute kata phusin oute mathousin), but by habituation 
(ethistheisin) for humans; poor things if they are habituated poorly, good if well. Or do 
men become happy in none of these ways, but either, like those humans the nymphs 
and deities possess, by being looked after by a some personal destiny (epipnoiai dai-
moniou tinos), like those who are inspired, or due to luck (dia tuchên), since many peo-
ple say happiness and good luck to be the same thing? What is clear is that it is in all or 
some of these ways that people become happy. (EE I 1.1214a14-26, tr. Kenny, adapted) 
For Aristotle, any and all of these causes can influence whether or not one be-
comes happy. But they are not all equally important causes, nor are they all causes 
in the same way. The role of luck, in particular, is highly problematic: Aristotle 
seems to conclude that not only may bad luck undermine happiness, but also that 
some people may turn out happy as a result of a kind of moral luck.10 The extent to 
which learning could possibly be a cause of happiness also presents enormous 
-------------------------------------------- 
deliberates about it (boulomenos)” (Democrates 55 = 68B89); “A man is reputable not only on the 
strength of what he does, but also of what he deliberates about (bouletai)” (Democrates 33 = 68B68). 
“Democrates” refers to a collection of maxims collected under that misnomer (= DK 68B35-115). 
10 Johnson 2015. Cf. Kenny 1988 and 1992. 
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difficulties. At the end of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that although 
teaching can influence and exhort certain kinds of people to become good, for the 
majority teaching is not sufficient, because many are motivated by fear, not shame 
(EN X 9,1179b4-13). Aristotle does not deny that teaching can influence the devel-
opment of moral and intellectual virtues – but he does call attention to the limita-
tions of teaching, something Isocrates had previously accused the sophists of fail-
ing to admit to their students and clients.11 For Aristotle, only some students have 
the talent and aptitude such that their character can be shaped by teaching, and this 
natural talent or aptitude seems to be what is meant by regarding nature as a cause 
of success, whether in the learning of skills, or in other kinds of activities, includ-
ing living well in general. Aristotle directly says that what is due to nature is not up 
to us, in contrast to argument and teaching, which unfortunately work only on 
certain kinds of students.  
Some think we become good by nature (phusei), some by habit (ethei), and others by 
teaching (didachêi). Nature’s contribution is clearly not up to us (ouk eph’ hêmin), but 
it can be found in those who are truly fortunate (eutuchesin) due to some divine cause 
(dia tinas theias). Argument and teaching, presumably, are not powerful in every case, 
but the soul of the student must be prepared beforehand in its habits, with a view to its 
enjoying and hating in a noble way, like soil that is to nourish seed. (EN X 10, 
1179b20-26) 
From the gloss on how nature is a cause in EE I 1 (“as we become tall people 
or short people or differently colored people”), we can see that Aristotle is refer-
ring to genetic or congenital endowment, particularly with reference to the capacity 
to use reason and to control one’s appetites.12 Being born with a superior nature of 
this kind happens to the fortunate or lucky (eutuchesin) due to some divine cause 
(dia tinas theias) and is therefore not up to us (ouk eph’ hêmin), which also shows 
that luck and divine providence are not up to us. The same causes determine the 
limits of personal responsibility: 
Since virtue and vice and the works that are their expressions are praised or blamed as 
the cause may be (for blame and praise are not given on account of things that come 
about by necessity or luck or nature (ex anagkês ê tuchês ê phuseôs), but on account of 
things that we ourselves are cause of, since if someone else is cause of something, it is 
he gets the blame and praise), it is clear that virtue and vice have to do with matters 
-------------------------------------------- 
11 On the limis of exhortation according to Aristotle, see Hutchinson and Johnson 2014. Isocrates 
says: “These capabilities – both for speeches and all the other works – have come about in those with 
natural talent (literally: “those with a good nature”, tois euphuesin) and who have been exercised by 
experience. And education makes these people more skillful and more resourceful at research; for it 
teaches them to take from a handier source that which they now happen upon fortuitously. But educa-
tion cannot produce good debaters or speechmakers out of those that have a relatively inadequate nature 
(tous katadeesteran tên phusin exhontas), although it can guide them towards these skills, and make 
them more intelligently disposed in many respects (polla phronimôterôs diakeisthai poiêseien)” (Is-
ocrates, Adv. Soph. 14-15). 
12 “One of our natural sources of action is reason, which is present is development proceeds without 
being stunted and another is appetite, which is an attribute present from the moment of birth. Roughly 
speaking, these are the two marks by which we define what is natural to us; it is either an attribute of 
everyone at birth, or something that comes to us if development proceeds normally, such as grey hair 
and old age and the like” (EE II 8, 1224b29-35, tr. Kenny) 
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where the man himself is the responsible source of his actions. (EE II 6, 1223a9-15, tr. 
Kenny, adapted) 
Aristotle later mentions these causes in making an almost desperate plea for 
recognition of the reality of human agency:  
If a noble life is something that comes to be due to luck (dia tuchên) or due to nature 
(dia phusin), it would be a hopeless dream for many people; its acquisition would be 
beyond their powers no matter how strenuous their endeavors. But if it is something in 
their own power and in accordance with their own activities (ei en tôi auton poion tina 
einai kai tas kat’ auton praxeis), then it will be a good both more widespread and di-
vine. (EE I 3, 1215a12-17, tr. Kenny, adapted)  
This point is further supported by what Aristotle says in his attempt to define 
the objects of deliberation (boulesis) in terms of actions that are ‘up to us’:  
We deliberate (bouleuometha) about what actions are up to us (tôn eph’hêmin praktôn), 
what we can do; these things are what remains to be done. For nature (phusis), neces-
sity (anagkê), and luck (tuchê) do seem to be causes, but so also do sense or intellect 
(nous) and everything that occurs through human agency (to di’anthropou). (EN III 5, 
1112a30-34)  
Democritus’ ethical maxims and fragments discuss each and every one of these 
causes (nature, necessity, luck, the gods, training, teaching, intellect) as causes of 
“becoming good” (B242), “doing good things” (B35), and of euthumia (euthumiê, 
B191). It has been established that such fragments are best interpreted as part of a 
eu-daimonistic or teleological account similar to the kind presupposed by Democri-
tus’ peer Socrates, and their successors Plato, and Aristotle,13 as already suggested 
by Arius Didymus, who wrote: “Democritus and Plato agree in placing happiness 
(eudaimonia) in the soul. Democritus writes like this: ‘Happiness does not dwell in 
flocks or gold; it is the soul which is the home of a person’s daimon’ (=B171). He 
also calls it euthumia, euestô, harmonia, summetria, and ataraxia. He says that it 
consists in distinguishing and discriminating pleasures, and that this is the finest 
and most advantageous thing for humans”.14 This laundry list of terms for De-
mocritus’ end indicates, however, that eudaimonia was not the only term, and 
probably not even the focus, of Democritus’ ethical writings.15 It is significant that 
the term more frequently found in our fragments, and in the most important one 
(B191), is euthumia, because this refers to a good state of something internal to the 
human body (the thumus), and thus something suitable for treatment by materialist 
psychology. One should compare not only the term eudaimonia, preferred by Plato 
and most subsequent moralists, but also the term eutuchia, preferred by popular 
thought (as Aristotle tells us).16 Both eutuchia and eudaimonia are terms that, ety-
mologically at least, refer to causes that Aristotle, as we have just seen, considers 
-------------------------------------------- 
13 Zeppi 1971 interprets Democritus’ ethics as eudaimonistic (508, 511, 525); cf. Stella 1942: 245. 
Dudley 1984 argues that eudaimonia is the fundamental term of Democritus’ ethics (377). Annas 2002 
presents the strongest case for reading Democritus’ ethics as eudaimonistic. For concerns about the 
anachronism of the eudaimonistic interpretation, see: Kahn 1998: 36-37. 
14 Stobaeus, Ecl. 2.52.13-53.20, tr. Annas 2002: 172. 
15 The only other fragment directly referring to eudaimonia is Democrates 6 (= B40). 
16 Von Fritz 1963: 34-35; Farrar 1988: 230. 
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not up to us, whereas Democritus explicitly connects euthumia with something that 
is up to us, namely changing one’s mind. So although it seems clear that Democri-
tus’ ethics is in some way teleological, there is a very good reason not to neglect 
those aspects in it that are not particularly eudaimonistic. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle does say that “most people agree about what it is 
called, since both the masses and sophisticated people call it eudaimonia, under-
standing eudaimonia as equivalent to living well and doing well” (EN I 2, 
1095a17-20, tr. Crisp, adapted), and this is certainly strong evidence that Democri-
tus can be interpreted along eudaimonistic lines. In the opening aporia of EE I 1, 
Aristotle treats the two questions, of what the good life consists in, and of what the 
causes of the good life are, as part of one and the same inquiry. If Democritus ex-
plicitly addressed the question of the causes of the good life (operationally defined 
as living well and doing well), then he will have necessarily answered the question 
of what the good life consists in.  
Democritus’	  approach	  to	  the	  aporia	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  good	  life	  
Let us begin the examination of Democritus’ position on the aporia raised and 
discussed by Aristotle with the following statement: “More people become good 
(agathoi ginontai) out of training (ex askêsios) than from nature (apo phusios)” 
(B242).17 The claim brings to mind the encouragement of the athletic trainer, who 
has every reason to say that more people become good runners or wrestlers due to 
exercise, training, and practice (i.e. following the advice of the trainers), than as a 
result of some inherited nature, such as body, strength, and reflexes given by ge-
netic endowment. Democritus is a kind of moral coach or even physician who 
encourages us to overcome our natural deficiencies with training and practice: 
“medicine heals diseases of the body, but wisdom removes the sufferings of the 
soul” (B31).18 What is this “training” that Democritus (and later Aristotle) refers 
to? The answer is that it is a kind of teaching which aims to reform the very nature 
of the student. “Nature and teaching (hê phusis kai hê didachê) are nearly like. For 
teaching also reforms (metarusmoi) the person, and by reforming it produces a 
nature (phusiopoiei)” (B33).19 On this view, a human nature is not fixed or deter-
minate, but can be reformed by teaching and reasoning.  
Democritus is not talking about a radical transformation from the nature of a 
human being to some other kind of animal or god along Pythagorean or Empedo-
clean lines, but rather a more prosaic and limited transformation from one kind of 
human being to another, that is, a change of personality or character. This is made 
clear by the following thought: “The senseless (anoêmones) are formed (rusmoun-
tai) by the gains of luck, but those who are experienced in these things by the gains 
of wisdom (sophiês)” (B197).20 Numerous fragments of Democritus discuss the 
-------------------------------------------- 
17 Stobaeus 3.29.66. 
18 Clement, Paed. I.6; cf. B36, B187, B290. 
19 Clement, Misc. 4.15; cf. Stobaeus 2.31.65. 
20 Stobaeus 3.4.71. 
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unfortunate behavior of the foolish, and such diatribes set the stage for a fragment 
which appears to advertise Democritus’ overall purpose for issuing ethical precepts 
in the form of thoughts (/judgments, gnomai): “These thoughts of mine (gnômeôn), 
if anyone follows them with sense (tis epaioi zun noôi), he will do many things 
worthy of a good man, and not do many bad things” (B35).21 The purpose of the 
ethical fragments of Democritus is thus to counteract the foolish tendencies that he 
so frequently decries by reforming the auditor and improving his nature, creating a 
different nature that will then go on to do many good not bad things.  
These claims about the power of education to reform the students’ natures 
utilize terminology native to Democritus’ physics.22 According to the now standard 
interpretation of the fragment (originally advanced by Vlastos), the idea is that the 
cluster of soul atoms that animate the human body may be physically reconfigured, 
“formed” (rusmountai) or “re-formed” (metarusmoi) through training and educa-
tion, and the rearrangement constitutes a new individual nature. Thus the idea that 
one’s nature is fixed or determinate at birth by genetic or congenital factors is re-
jected by Democritus, who holds that one’s individual nature may be reformed, and 
not only into a single “second nature” but more or less constantly reformed.23 This 
rejection does not exclude, but rather embraces the much more obvious point that 
our individual nature influences the extent to which we are susceptible to being 
reformed by teaching, as Aristotle stresses. But Democritus’ radical idea of creat-
ing new natures through education is his own original application of the profound 
idea that the mind and its material configuration exhibit “plasticity”, permitting the 
modification of habits, as is possible to a much more limited extent in some other 
animals but not at all in inanimate matter. The atomistic origin of this idea was 
recognized by William James when he defined the term “plasticity” in his Princi-
ples of Psychology.24 Plasticity is by now a major hypothesis of cognitive psychol-
ogy. It has important therapeutic implications for stress-reduction and anxiety 
relief. A fascinating recent study, for example, has shown that “mindfulness train-
ing” (a form of meditation) can alter the grey matter of the brain in regions associ-
ated with “emotional regulation” and “perspective taking”.25 Democritus seems to 
-------------------------------------------- 
21 Democrates 1. 
22 Vlastos 1945/1946; Luria 1964; cf. Tortora 1984. Taylor 1967 rejected this, but reconsidered his 
reservations in 1999. 
23 Tortora 1984: 395. 
24 “The habits of an elementary particle of matter cannot change (on the principles of the atomistic 
philosophy), because the particle is itself an unchangeable thing; but those of a compound mass of 
matter can change, because they are in the last instance due to the structure of the compound, and either 
outward forces or inward tensions can, from one hour to another, turn that structure into something 
different from what it was. […] Plasticity, then, in the wide sense of the word, means the possession of 
a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once. Each rela-
tively stable phase of equilibrium in such a structure is marked by what we may call a new set of habits. 
Organic matter, especially nervous tissue, seems endowed with a very extraordinary degree of plasticity 
of this sort; so that we may without hesitation lay down as our first proposition the following, that the 
phenomena of habit in living beings are due to the plasticity of the organic materials of which their 
bodies are composed” (James 1890: 104-105). 
25 “Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), one of the most widely used mindfulness train-
ing programs, has been reported to produce positive effects on psychological well-being and to amelio-
rate symptoms of a number of disorders. Here, we report a controlled longitudinal study to investigate 
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have understood the fact that certain ways of thinking could influence the physical 
configuration of the mind and body, thus: “it is fitting for humans to produce rea-
soning (logon poieisthai) about the soul more than about the body. For perfection 
of soul corrects badness of dwelling (/body), but strength of dwelling without rea-
soning does not make the soul any better” (B187).26 
Plasticity, in fact, is essential to any theory of habit, and specifically to the idea 
of reforming the habits of a living thing. Although Aristotle must accordingly ac-
cept the theory of plasticity in his own account of habituation, he is surprisingly 
pessimistic about the power of teaching to reform people (or at least certain kinds 
of people). This reserved or conservative position, expressed also by Isocrates and 
Plato, may have been justified in response to the excesses of the so-called sophists 
in advertising the benefits of their teachings. But Aristotle probably has Democri-
tus specifically in mind when he uses unmistakably atomistic terminology in reit-
erating the point: “what argument could reform (metarruthmisai) people like this? 
For displacing by argument what has long been entrenched in people’s characters 
is difficult if not impossible” (EN X 10, 1179b16-18, tr. Crisp).27 
Democritus, by contrast, is much more optimistic about the power of education 
to reform: if you follow his ethical advice, he promises, you will do many things 
worthy of a good person and not do many things worthy of a bad one. But if learn-
ing the sayings of Democritus “with sense” (zun noôi) is up to us, and if in doing 
this one may reform one’s nature, then doing many good or bad things would be up 
to us. Thus the issue of what is up to us turns out to be central to Democritus’ phi-
losophy, as Charles Kahn recognized when he wrote that, for Democritus, “moral 
wisdom is conceived essentially as psychological prudence. He is the first propo-
nent of what is known today as cognitive therapy”28. 
Nature, then, is not the only cause of whether one does good or bad things, be-
cause human nature is docile, and individual nature may be reformed by teaching 
so that, in combination with certain acts of attention, good sense, and right reason-
ing, the agent will do many good things and not do many foolish things. What 
about luck? Democritus harps on the unreliability or insufficiency of luck in sev-
eral fragments: “Luck provides an extravagant table, but temperance a self-
sufficient one” (B210); “Luck gives great gifts, but it is unreliable, while nature is 
self-sufficient. For this reason it defeats the greater object of hope by being lesser 
but reliable” (B176).29 This implies that Democritus accepts that luck is, in some 
cases or to some extent at least, a factor in human success and failure. But De-
mocritus harshly criticizes those who offer bad luck as an excuse for lack of intel-
ligence: 
-------------------------------------------- 
pre–post changes in brain gray matter concentration attributable to participation in an MBSR program. 
[…] The results suggest that participation in MBSR is associated with changes in gray matter concentra-
tion in brain regions involved in learning and memory processes, emotion regulation, self-referential 
processing, and perspective taking” (Hölzel et al. 2011: 36-43). 
26 Stob. Flor. III t. 1; cf. B36. 
27 Luria 1964: 16. 
28 Kahn 1998: 35. 
29 Stobaeus 3.5.26 and 2.9.5. 
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Humans have fashioned an idol of luck (tuchês) as an excuse for their own lack of sense 
(anoiês). For by nature thought (gnômê) and luck conflict. And this very enemy of in-
telligence (phronêsi) itself they say to be in control (kratein). Moreover, repudiating 
and erasing intelligence, they set down luck in its place. For they do not sing the praises 
of intelligence as good luck, but of luck as the most intelligent of things. (B119)30 
Thought, intelligence, good sense, and so forth are considered causes up to us, 
and so the failure to reap their benefits is considered blameworthy; the excuse that 
luck is the cause of one’s failures is accused of being an appeal to a false idol. 
Intelligence and thought should be considered to be in control instead of luck. This 
is an extremely important point, because it is reasonable to see moral luck as a 
greater threat to personal responsibility than causal necessity. For this very reason, 
Democritus may have tried to eliminate luck as a cause of good and bad things.31 
Democritus takes a similar position with respect to the gods. 
The gods have given to humans all the good things, both in olden times and now. But 
not bad and harmful and unprofitable things: these the gods have given to humans nei-
ther in olden times nor now, rather they bring them upon themselves through blindness 
of sense and ignorance (dia nou tuphlotêta kai agnômosunên). (68B175)32 
Humans pray to the gods to cause them to be healthy, not realizing they have the power 
for this in themselves (tautês dunamin en eautois). But through weakness of will, acting 
contrary to this by excessive indulgence, they give up their health to their own desires 
(epithumiêisin). (68B234)33 
Humans destroy their own health and bring bad things upon themselves 
“through blindness of intellect and ignorance” – causal factors that we have seen 
are considered up to us. Democritus explicitly says that these causes, unlike the 
will of the gods or luck, are “in their own power” (tautês dunamin en eautois). But 
as with luck, humans attribute bad things to false causes by blaming the gods for 
disease, and by appealing to them as the cause of health, when the cause of one’s 
own ill health in actually in oneself. The same example is used by Democritus to 
make a different point about human responsibility. 
If the body were to bring a suit against the soul for all the pain it felt and bad things it 
had suffered while alive, and one were to become a judge of the complaint, one would 
happily vote against the soul, on the grounds that the soul had destroyed part of the 
body through negligence, and dissolved others with strong drinks, and corrupted and 
ripped it up through the love of pleasures, just as if holding responsible (aitiasamenos) 
the careless user of an instrument or tool in a bad condition. (68B159)34 
This fragment resonates with the idea that “perfection of soul corrects badness 
of dwelling, but strength of dwelling without reasoning does not make the soul any 
better” (B187, discussed above). As Kahn noticed, “what is characteristic of De-
-------------------------------------------- 
30 Eusebius, Praep. Evangel. XIV.27.5; cf. Stobaeus 2.8.16. 
31 If it is right to interpret Democritus, as many commentators do, as the object of Aristotle’s criti-
cism in Physics II 5, 196a1-6; e.g. Simplicius’ commentary on this passage 330.14-20. 
32 Stobaeus 2.9.4. 
33 Stobaeus 3.18.30. 
34 Plutarch, De libid. et aegr. 2; cf. De sanit. praec. 24. 
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mocritus is to make the soul causally responsible for the condition of the body”.35 
Democritus’ soul has ultimate agency, and the report of Arius Didymus (quoted 
above), that “Democritus places happiness in the soul”, indicates not so much De-
mocritus’ commitment to eudaimonism, as his commitment to the power up to us 
as individual agents that can cause our own living well and doing well.  
With these fragments, we have now seen Democritus take a position on each 
and every one of the causes mentioned by Aristotle as candidates for causes of 
human goodness and success. Democritus downplays luck and the gods as causes, 
much more so than Aristotle (who accepts that luck is a major factor in causing 
eudaimonia, and who even accepts by the end of the Eudemian Ethics that some 
people are happy as a result of a certain kind of luck and divine oversight). 
Democritus holds human nature to be docile and modifiable by training and learn-
ing, and he is notably more optimistic about teaching as a cause of human im-
provement than Aristotle. On the Democritean picture, anyone’s nature may be 
transformed by thought (provided they pay attention, think with sense, etc.) so that 
one avoids senselessness and becomes wise. Thus Democritus downplays precisely 
those causes Aristotle (later) said not to be up to us, at the same time that he em-
phasizes those causes that Aristotle (later) said are up to us. 
The	  power	  to	  change	  your	  mind	  
The account I have just presented has been at the very general and abstract 
level of causes like nature, luck, the gods, training, teaching, and intellect. But now 
I want to look at a concrete case of how Democritus thinks that by changing the 
way we think about things – changing our minds, so to speak in literally materialist 
terms – we may affect whether we lead a tranquil and placid life, or one full of 
painful emotional instability and unsatisfied desires.  
The first example deals with an analysis of the causes of two different out-
comes: whether we remain satisfied with what we have, or resort to criminal activi-
ties motivated by jealousy and greed. The example is contained in the longest con-
tinuous fragment of Democritus’ ethics and is of paramount importance for the 
interpretation of his moral psychology. The fragment is well known, and I will 
only briefly discuss it, divided into two parts (a-b).36 
(a) For humans, euthumia comes about with moderate joy (metriotêti terpsios) 
and a balanced way of life (biou summetriêi); excesses and deficiencies (elleiponta 
kai huperballonta) like to fluctuate (metapiptein) and induce great changes in the 
soul; and among those souls that change over great intervals (diastêmatôn) there is 
neither stability (eustathees) nor euthumia. Therefore upon the things that are in 
one’s power (epi tois dunatois) one should hold the thought (dei echein tên 
gnomên), and be content with what one has, having few memories or thoughts 
(oligên mnêmên echonta kai têi dianoiai) of those who are admired and envied and 
not paying attention to them (mê prosedreuonta). (B191) 
-------------------------------------------- 
35 Kahn 1998: 34. 
36 B191 = Stobaeus 3.1.210. 
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The expression epi tois dunatois (“the things in one’s power”) is here used 
conventionally with reference to one’s capabilities or powers relative to those of 
others, especially rivals. It is only because I am not able to do certain things that 
others are capable of doing (e.g. possess more wealth, power, or beauty) that my 
dwelling on such things causes psychic distress, afflicting my soul with unrealistic 
desires and appetites that I cannot fulfill and that would be harmful if I could. Thus 
the expression “in our power” is not used universally, as above when Democritus 
insisted that those who blame the gods for their poor health ought to consider “the 
power over this to exist in themselves” (tautês dunamin en eautois, B234). How-
ever, the imperative in B191 for the students to consider carefully the things “in 
their power” (epi tois dunatois) implies that at least this re-commended thought 
process is up to us (any of us) to do so, at least any of us who listen to what De-
mocritus is saying with nous. The prescription is part of Democritean cognitive-
behavioral therapy, a piece of concrete advice: do not obsess about (“have little 
thought or memory of”) your rivals – do not even pay attention to them (mê prose-
dreuonta). If one only changes the focus of one’s attention, one can influence one’s 
psychic tranquility and even bodily health. In line with this, the continuation of the 
Democritean fragment goes into much greater detail about how one should think, 
and what about, and suggests that those changes of mind (of soul) will have posi-
tive affects on the body (or remove harmful affects).37 
(b) But one should observe (theôreein) the lives of those who are in distress, 
concentrating (ennooumenon) on the grievous things they suffer, so that the things 
one has and already possesses will seem great and enviable, and no longer would 
you be afflicted in the soul by appetites (epithumeonti). For the man who admires 
those who have and are deemed blessed by others, and in his thought and memory 
at all hours is dwelling upon them, is always compelled (anagkazetai) to find new 
opportunities and to overshoot, and because of the appetite (epithumiên) to do 
wrongs which the laws forbid. That is why by not dwelling so as to doubt certain 
things, but dwelling upon such things so as to have euthumia, by comparing one’s 
own life with those who do worse, and by deeming oneself blessed (makarizein 
eôuton) by keeping in mind (enthumeumenon) the things they suffer, one does and 
fares much better than they do. For by holding fast to this thought (gnômês), you 
will live with more euthumia, and will drive away those not small distresses in 
one’s life: jealousy, envy and malice. (B191) 
This part of the fragment is important not only because of what it says is up to 
us, but also what it says by way of contrast: that some kinds of misdirected think-
ing can constrain or compel (anagkazetai) one to act in a certain way. By dwelling 
on those who have more money and power, our minds are deformed by excessive 
desires we are likely unable to fulfill, causing continual psychic distress or anxiety. 
-------------------------------------------- 
37 A condensed version of the same argument appears in another fragment: “The person trying to 
have euthumia needs neither to do many things (whether in public or private) nor, whatever he under-
takes, to chose beyond his capabilities and nature; but he must be on guard so as to – when struck by 
luck and his thoughts run to getting more for himself – put it down and not apply himself beyond what 
he is capable of. For the right amount is safer than a huge amount.” (Stobaeus 4.39.25 = 68B3; cf. 
Plutarch, Tranq. 465c). 
 Monte Ransome Johnson 12 
These desires produce intense appetites that become compulsive, in effect forcing 
or compelling (literally “necessitating”) one to engage in vicious or criminal be-
haviors in order to fulfill those desires. This very appearance of the idea of an 
agent being “compelled” into a set of criminal or vicious behavior by a certain way 
of thinking implies that the same agent is not compelled to embrace that very way 
of thinking that caused this state of affairs – on the contrary, the whole point of the 
fragment is to encourage the student to reject that way of thinking and embrace a 
different, more realistic, more tranquil, more moderate way of thinking and living. 
In his view euthumia is ultimately up to us, since it is in our power to turn our 
attention away from the causes of envy and jealousy that cause psychic turbulence, 
towards objects of moderate desires which when obtained (and even when not 
obtained) do not cause significant psychic disturbance. Our euthumia is up to us 
because what we think about, including what we deliberate about, is up to us.  
The	  misapprehension	  of	  necessity	  
The plasticity of human nature allows us to improve ourselves by choosing 
what thoughts we seize on, and then focus or dwell on, and finally act on. But it is 
equally possible for plasticity to work in a harmful way, since it allows not only for 
a reformation to a better nature, but also a deformation to a worse one. Thus there 
arises the possibility of misunderstanding one’s own nature, for example one’s 
natural needs: “The needy animal knows how much it needs, but the needy man 
does not realize this” (B289); “It is irrational not to yield to the necessities in ac-
cordance with one’s way of life” (B198).38 The other animals, not being capable of 
acting rationally, are not capable of acting irrationally in this particular way – fail-
ing to yield to necessities or knowing what is really needed. This kind of confusion 
is entirely a product of human agency.  
Democritus thus assumes that thinking rationally or irrationally, and realizing 
the real extent of our needs, is up to us. If even things that really are necessary we 
need not accept as necessary (as madness and delusion show), then the mere ap-
pearance of necessity cannot necessitate a certain way of thinking, much less of 
acting. Psychological necessitation, in the strict sense, is impossible. We may be 
inclined to interpret the purpose of the imperative to “yield to the necessities in 
accordance with one’s way of life” to be to impress on the student the importance 
of undertaking necessary work that one might otherwise be inclined to slack on, 
and there are some fragments that function in this way: “those who undertake work 
voluntarily (ekousioi) prepare themselves more easily for involuntary work” 
(B240).39 But in the long fragment B191 above, Democritus’ emphasis is not really 
on the failure to perceive things that are needful, but rather on the misapprehension 
of things as necessary or compulsory that in reality are not: “that which the habita-
tion (/body) needs is readily available for everyone, without trouble and toil; but 
the things needing trouble and toil, and which bring hardship to life, these the habi-
-------------------------------------------- 
38 Stobaeus 4.44.64 and 3.4.72. 
39 Stobaeus 3.29.63. 
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tation does not crave, but the bad habituation of thought does (hê tês gnômês ka-
koêthiê)” (B223).40 Therefore the misapprehension of necessity is due to a certain 
way of thinking that can be changed and is thus up to us.  
A suite of fragments offers a very concrete example of the kind of changeable 
thought process that Democritus describes as up to us. Consider the decision 
whether or not to have children. Democritus points out that, despite appearances, 
this is not in fact a necessity. “It does not seem to me that one needs (chrênai) to 
have children; for in having children I see many and great risks, and many pains, 
but few fruits and these poor and feeble” (B276).41 But it appears to many to be a 
necessity, and a certain flawed way of thinking about this has by now become 
customary. 
To humans, it seems to be one of the necessities (tôn anagkaiôn) to produce children, 
by nature and some original instinct. And it seems clear also from the other animals. 
For they produce offspring in accordance with nature but in no way for the sake of any 
advantage. But when they are born they endure hardship and struggle to nourish them 
as much as each is able, and they are very fearful when they are small and if the chil-
dren suffer anything they grieve. This is the nature of every kind of thing that has life. 
But among humans a custom (nomizon) has been made up so that some people even 
expect to gain from their offspring. (68B278)42 
The apparent necessity to have children undoubtedly compels many people to 
have children, but this is not in reality a necessity, at least not absolutely or for any 
particular agent. But by changing how one thinks about these things, for example 
by dwelling not on how successful my neighbors’ children are, but instead on the 
pains and risks of rearing children, I become the cause of whether or not I have 
children. As Aristotle says in his own discussion of voluntary human action: “the 
human is a first principle or begetter of his actions as he is of his children” (EN III 
6, 1113b18-19). The decision whether or not to have children is a paradigm of 
something that should be considered up to us, even though it customarily is not. 
The unexamined assumption that I must have children, so that I can gain prestige 
and pride from their successes, is a kind of deformation or perversion of nature (as 
the contrast with the instinctual actions of the other animals shows). Fortunately 
there is a remedy in changing my mind about these things by reasoning about the 
real nature and extent of my needs. 
If this interpretation of Democritus is right, then thinking, intelligence, and 
good sense should be understood as causes of individual decisions such as whether 
to have children. These causes are not in turn determined by other causes like na-
ture, luck, or the gods. We have seen concrete examples of how changing one’s 
thinking can transform one’s nature, one’s desires and passions, and then one’s 
actions as a result: by focusing on the less instead of the more fortunate I may 
avoid excesses of desire and surfeit that cause psychic disturbance; by recognizing 
-------------------------------------------- 
40 Stobaeus 3.10.43. Accepting the reading kakoêthiê (Wilamovitz 1925: 306) instead of kakothigiê 
(as in the text of Diels). 
41 Stobaeus 4.24.31. 
42 Stobaeus 4.24.33 
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that the natural necessity to have children is illusory I may avoid many pains and 
risks. All of this is within our power, and should be considered up to us. 
Self-­government,	  shame	  and	  law	  
The above fragments show Democritus concerned to limit the power of neces-
sity over us: the second part of B191 shows that the psychological compulsion to 
commit criminal acts may be avoided by changing what one thinks about and con-
centrates on; the fragments about children show how what is conventionally 
viewed as compulsory can be understood as a matter of individual choice following 
Democritus’ thought. In some other fragments, Democritus also suggests that com-
pulsion in the form of the law has limited power. For example, “oaths which were 
taken under compulsion (en anagkêisin) by the base are not upheld once they es-
cape” (B239).43 Compulsion can make one take an oath, but nothing can compel 
the inner conviction of the agent. For this reason moral exhortation is said to be 
more effective than political laws: 
For the sake of virtue, utilizing exhortation (protropêi) and persuasion by argument 
(logou peithoi) is evidently stronger than law and necessity (nomôi kai anagkêi). For he 
will likely do wrong in secret who is kept from injustice by law, but he who is led to 
what must be done by persuasion will not likely do something wrong, whether in secret 
or in broad daylight. That is why by comprehending (sunesei) and also by knowing 
(epistêmêi) of right actions one becomes courageous and right thinking (euthugnômos). 
(B181)44 
This point of view is directly contradicted by Aristotle, as we saw, when he 
denies that exhortation and teaching are sufficient, asserting that laws and espe-
cially punishments are inevitably necessary to habituate the majority to virtue (EN 
X 9, 1179b4-13). A crucial point of contention is about the relative effectiveness of 
external psychological necessitation arrived at through a process of legislation, and 
persuasion arrived at through a process of education. Even the law itself, Democri-
tus argues, is most effective when it persuades the agent to do something as being 
beneficial for his way of life: “The law intends (bouletai) to benefit the way of life 
of human beings. And it is able to do so, when they intend to be affected well. For 
to those who are persuaded (peithomenoisi) it indicates its unique virtue” (B248).45 
Recognizing that plasticity of human nature allows for reform and habituation, 
and that not only compulsion but also persuasion shapes people and changes be-
havior, and in general that one can change one’s own fortune by changing one’s 
thinking and reasoning, Democritus made an enormous breakthrough by conceiv-
ing of an autonomous source of moral sanction. Commentators have rightly 
credited him with anticipating a notion that we find returning to a prominent place 
in ethics in Immanuel Kant.46 
-------------------------------------------- 
43 Stobaeus 3.28.13. 
44 Stobaeus 2.31.59. 
45 Stobaeus, Flor. IV 1, 33. 
46 Natorp 1893; Kahn 1985, 1998. 
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No one should feel more shame in front of other people than himself, nor be more pre-
pared to do bad things whether no one or everyone will know; but he should be most 
ashamed of himself, and institute this law for his soul (touton nomon têi psuchêi kath-
estanai), with the result (hôste) that he will do nothing unseemly. (B264)47 
I read the last clause as a result of the institution of the law, and not a specifi-
cation of the content of the law. If the latter reading were required, then the frag-
ment would issue into an empty imperative that one do nothing unseemly. On the 
proposed reading, the fragment is another expression of Democritus’ conception of 
thought itself as a cause of actions. The law that should be self-imposed is the 
imperative: feel no less shame before oneself than before others. The result of this 
thought (/judgment) is that one’s nature will be transformed in such a way that one 
will not desire to do things that are bad or ugly. Democritus argues that this inner 
source of moral sanction is necessary for moral reform: “The man who does 
shameful things must first feel shame before himself” (B84).48 Self-sanctioning is 
more effective than compulsion by another agent or the law. In support of this 
interpretation is the fact that Aristotle expresses skepticism about being able to 
reform most people’s natures through argument and teaching specifically because 
people are motivated by fear, not shame. According to Aristotle, the sense of 
shame cannot possibly be used to habituate people into being good, much less a 
self-imposed sense of shame.49 
Democritus, to the contrary, considers the self-imposed sanction of shame to 
be potentially so effective that conventional laws would be unnecessary provided 
one’s actions do not harm others. “The laws or conventions (nomoi) would not 
prevent each one living according to his own will (kat’idiên exousiên), if one man 
did not harm another. For envy prepares a source of strife (B245).”50 The second 
sentence expresses the concern to avoid envy or jealousy as a motivation for crimi-
nal activity, by shifting one’s own thought from a focus on the more fortunate 
towards the less fortunate, as we read in fragment B191. Since that act of attention 
or exercise of thought is up to us, the whole sequence of actions that follow from 
either adjusting one’s thought or not is understood to be up to us. 
The person who follows Democritus’ teaching with nous can autonomously 
enact the moral sanction of shame on themselves, and thus avoid bad actions all 
together. The moral sanction is a law, but one imposed on us by us, because it is 
our own thought, and so is up to us. For such an autonomous person, convention-
ally or externally imposed laws are redundant and irrelevant. By living freely, such 
a person voluntarily does good things. This seems to be the meaning of the some-
what cryptic remark attributed to Democritus that “the laws are a bad invention 
(epinoian), and it is not needed for the wise man to obey laws but to live freely 
(eleutheriōs)” (A166).51  
-------------------------------------------- 
47 Stobaeus 4.5.46. 
48 Democrates 50. 
49 EN X 9, 1179b4-13; cf. in general EN IV 9. 
50 Stobaeus 3.38.53.  
51 Epiphanius of Salamis, Adv. Haer. 3.2.9. 
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